Credible Threats in Negotiations : A Game-theoretic Approach (Theory and Decision Library C:)
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Book Description
The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results obtained in the rapidly expanding game-theoretic literature. The relative impacts of the fundamental forces on the bargaining outcome are discussed and related to the visions expressed by Nobel-laureate John Nash. Many topics -such as robustness of the results with respect to the diversity of known bargaining procedures, the role of commitment and policy bargaining situations- receive their most extensive treatment to date. Credible Threats in Negotiations is suitable as a textbook for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and a necessity as a resource for scholars interested in bargaining situations.
Book Info
The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective.
Credible Threats in Negotiations : A Game-theoretic Approach (Theory and Decision Library C:)
Credible Threats in Negotiations : A Game-theoretic Approach (Theory and Decision Library C:),Wilko Bolt,Harold Houba,Springer,1402071833,Business & Economics,Business / Economics / Finance,Business Decision Making,Decision Making & Problem Solving,Economic Theory,Economics - Theory,Game Theory,General,Negotiating,Negotiation in business,Science/Mathematics,Threat (Psychology),Business & Economics / Economics / General
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